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FEDERAL LEGISLATION
THE REACH OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE POWER
(Lawyer Service Letter, April 19, 1939, New York
State Bar Association)
The scope of the power of the central government over commerce has now been defined, under two of the most recent decisions of
the Supreme Court, to cover situations which in the opinion of many
lawyers were thought to be of exclusive concern to the States. It is
therefore of the greatest importance to the bar and to the public that
the implications and effects of these two decisions be promptly studied
and appraised.
One of these decisions involves the National Labor
Relations Act and the other the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.
In the former case (NLRB v. Fainblatt,U. S. Sup. Ct., April 17,
1939), the federal power under the commerce clause was held to extend
to unfair labor practices of a small "contract" clothing manufacturer
not engaged in interstate commerce but whose product was regularly
shipped in interstate commerce by the company which contracted for
such manufacture. In the latter case (Mulford v, Smith, U. S. Sup. Ct.,
April 17, 1939), the federal power was held to extend to the absolute
prohibition of interstate commerce, and a fortiori to the limitation of the
amount of a given commodity which may be transported in such commerce, whenever Congress intended to "foster, protect and conserve"
such commerce "or to prevent the flow of commerce from working harm
to the people of the nation."
The Fainblattcase aforesaid is apparently bottomed on the proposition that a labor dispute in the plant of the intrastate manufacturer
might lead to a strike and to a reduced output which in turn would curtail the interstate shipments of the distributor who had contracted for
the manufacturing. Such a strike might also result in the curtailment
of the shipment of raw materials to the manufacturer from other states.
[Ed.: The editor has done his best in analyzing thus the basis of jurisdiction as described in the majority opinion; he confesses, however, to
unusual difficulty in grasping as thoroughly as he would wish certain
of the paragraphs of the opinion.] The vast implications of this theory
of jurisdiction ought to be weighed carefully by the bar because of other
federal legislation, the validity of which has not yet beeni passed upon
by the Supreme Court, and also because of possible future legislation
in the field of commerce. That the minority of the Court (Justices
McReynolds and Butler) were greatly concerned with this holding is
evidenced by their assertion that Congress may now validly regulate
wages, hours, output, prices, etc.; that, as now construed, the power
to regulate interstate commerce "brings within the ambit of federal
control most if not all activities of the Nation; subjects states to the
will of Congress; and permits disruption of our federated system."
The concluding paragraph of the minority opinion sounds an ominous
note:
"The present decision and the reasoning offered to support
it will inevitably intensify bewilderment. The resulting curtail-
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ment of the independence reserved to the States and the tremendous
enlargement of federal power denote the serious impairment of the
very foundation of our federated system. Perhaps the change of
direction, no longer capable of concealment, will give potency to
the efforts of those who apparently hope to end a system of government found inhospitable to their ultimate designs."
The Mulford case aforesaid, upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as a valid exercise of the commerce power, is of equal
importance with the Fainblatt decision; in fact, the two would seem to
supplement each other. The same majority held in the Mulford case
that, when Congress intends at any time to prevent interstate commerce
from "working harm to the people of the nation," the shipment across
state lines of any product of any nature whatsoever may be entirely
prohibited. Hitherto, in cases of prohibition of commerce the nature
of the commerce has been a controlling factor. Thus, lottery tickets
(Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321), adulterated food (Hipolite Egg
Co. v.United States, 220 U. S. 45), "white slaves" (Hoke v. United
States, 227 U. S. 308), stolen automobiles (Brooks v. United States,
267 U. S. 432), and kidnapped persons (Gooch v.United States, 297
U. S. 124) have been held subjects of forbidden commerce. Hitherto,
the Supreme Court had stated that the power to prohibit the interstate
shipment of lottery tickets did not extend to "pig iron, steel rails, or
most of the vast body of commodities" Wilson v.New, 243 U. S. 332,
346). This doctrine has now been superseded by the Mulford case.
To be sure, the Mulford case involved the shipment of tobacco, which
is considered by some as a harmful commodity, but the Court made no
point of this and travelled the whole distance.

TAXATION-DOUBLE TAXATION
Decedent, while a resident of Colorado, created a trust consisting
of federal, state, and other bonds. The trustee was a Denver bank.
Thereafter the settlor moved to New York, where she died. An inheritance tax upon the trust res in Colorado was imposed by that State.
When New York also sought to collect death taxes based upon the
trust property, the Court of Appeals held that New York could not
tax. Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States,
reversed. In a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, concurred
in by Mr. Justice McReynolds, Mr. Justice Butler, and Mr. Justice
Roberts, it was stated that: "I think that the decision in this case
pushes the fiction of mobilia sequuntur personam to an unwarranted
extreme and thus unnecessariily produces an unjust result."
(Graves v.
Elliott, U. S. Sup. Ct., May 29, 1939.)
(Lawyer Service Letter,
N. Y. S., Bar Association, June 7, 1939.)
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HUMAN OBSOLESCENCE AND SUPERANNUATION
(Los Angeles Bar Bulletin)
It does not require a great deal of objective thinking to reach the
logical conclusion that a very large percentage of our people expect the
Government, federal, state and county, to support them permanently
regardless of the economic consequences. Nor is it difficult to foresee
that concessions to the ever-growing demand for "relief," and pensions
will slowly but inevitably eat away the very foundations of our national economic structure. More than that; the steady, glacial erosion
of individual independence and initiative is weakening those characteristics that made us a great democracy and now threatens to bring about
dire changes of government.
It must be recognized that the problem is not temporary; that it
is not due entirely to "depressions" or "recessions," but is definitely a
permanent one; that its solution demands the best collective thinking and
planning of all who would discard political considerations.
Obviously, we cannot long continue over the paths of least resistance by giving way to pressure groups, but must blaze new and rougher
roads to a sane solution. Great fundamental changes in our social and
industrial standards are moving with relentless force to increase rather
than decrease the number of persons whose demands or necessities must
be considered. Among many factors are these: Medical science has prolonged life's expectancy far beyond that of any time in recorded history,
and technological advances are displacing an ever-growing army of
workers. Thus we have the new problem of human obsolescence, added
to the old familiar problems of superannuation, that are little less than
appalling.
How long this situation can endure without a serious breakdown
in our social and economic structures is the question facing every one of
us, and demanding an intelligent answer.

DISCRIMINATORY DISCHARGES
For some time previous to the demand of a union for collective
bargaining the employer had been considering on business grounds the
abolition of the positions of four employees. Immediately after the
demand for bargaining, such positions were eliminated. The National
Labor Relations Board held that such discharges were discriminatory
and designed to hinder the union in its bargaining efforts. Although
the Board conceded that the positions were abolished for business reasons, it was convinced that the employer timed the discharges so as to
embarrass the union.
(NLRB v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., Inc.,
National Labor Relations Board, 12 N. L. R. B., No. 130, May 27,
1939.)
(Lawyer Service Letter, N. Y. S., Bar Association, June
7, 1939.)

